The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition | 
|  | | | Title: | The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition | | Author: | Robert Axelrod | | Publisher: | Basic Books | | Type: | Book / Paperback | | Publication Date: | 04 December, 2006 | | ISBN / ISBN-13: | 0465005640 / 9780465005642 | | List Price: | $16.00 | | You Save: | $0.80 | | Amazon Price: | $15.20 | |
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Product Description
Updated for the first time, the classic book on why cooperation is not only natural but also the best survival strategy The Evolution of Cooperation addresses a simple yet age-old question: If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. This unexpected victory proved that cooperation--one might even say altruism--is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations. "This book, if read, grasped and applied, could have a profound effect." (Wall Street Journal) "A fascinating, provocative, and important book." (Douglas R. Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach)
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Customer Reviews:
• A Modern Masterpiece 13 September, 2008
I first read this book in college for the course Philosophical Puzzles - an examination of logical paradoxes (I won't bother Messrs. Strunk and White with the correct plural formation). Though this book is, in my opinion, the definitive resource for understanding the prisoner's dilemma (iterated or otherwise), the ramifications of Axelrod's work extend far beyond the wierd little worlds in which we find ourselves in undergraduate philosophy classrooms. It's a no-brainer that this book should be at least Summer reading for anyone interested in sociology, evolutionary biology or game theory. However, this book does not get the attention it deserves in the world of legal education. I believe it should be required reading for every law student. All you lawyers and future lawyers out there, you will learn more about the nature of law from Prof. Axelrod than you will ever learn from Hegel, and you will have a lot more fun in the process. I cannot recommend The Evolution of Cooperation highly enough.
- Reviewed by customer ID: A2WRUZVSTT7DKB
• Check Out "the Selfish Gene" Instead 28 August, 2008
This book was FAR too dense and technical. I bought it expecting to find something comparable to what Richard Dawkins would write. Instead, I found a book that was full of mathematical proofs and descriptions of computer programs. At whom was this aimed? There are very few people who could read something like this intelligently.
One possible organization might have been: Some case studies of varied cases and then a description of the theory why they happened they way they did. And then appendices at the back that contained the proofs.
I didn't make it past the first chapter, and I suspect that most others won't.
- Reviewed by customer ID: AKR6UK8O6DM6X
• Cooperation At The Long Run 10 December, 2008
Book review:
Axelrod, Robert. (1984) The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books
Cooperation at the long run
The question Robert Axelrod poses in his book "the evolution of cooperation" relevant for all social sciences is; under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? Axelrod explores this question by the establishment of two tournaments of the prisoner's dilemma game. In this game two players are competing against each other to get the greatest pay off. The game is characterized by four mechanisms. The unavailability of mechanisms to enforce threats or commitments, reputations of other players are unknown, there is no way to eliminate other players and there is no way to change the players pay off. If both players cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma game they get rewarded with payoff's R = 3 (reward) points. If one of the players cooperates while the other defects the player who defected gets T = 5 (temptation to defect) and the other player receives S = 0 (sucker effect). Finally, if both players defect they will be rewarded with P = 1 (punishment).
During the two prisoner's dilemma game tournaments the simplest strategy, and the strategy which only could reach a draw as the best result, won from all the other strategies. TITFORTAT was this superior strategy, TITFORTAT cooperates in the first move and than does whatever the other player does in the previous move. The TITFORTAT strategy was superior over other strategies due to its characteristics. TITFORTAT is a strategy that is nice because it cooperates in the first move. The strategy is forgivable if the other player decides to cooperate again. Furthermore TITFORTAT is a clear strategy that makes it easy to identify and finally it is retaliatory, because it retaliates if the other player defects. These features make TITFORTAT a robust strategy.
Due to this robustness TITFORTAT won the strategy, because other strategies, for example TESTER, where unsuccessful and did not survive during the development of the game. TESTER defects on the first move and in this manner tries to identify the other player's repose. After a defect from the other player TESTER is forgivable and cooperates and than plays TITFORTAT. No other strategy was able to win from TITFORTAT in the long run, which makes the TITFORTAT strategy collectively stable and thus unable to be invaded. This brings Axelrod to the conclusion that in a world of unconditional defections cooperation can emerge.
Axelrod links his findings to empirical evidence, from, for example, WO 1 and from cooperation in biological systems. Axelrod describes the live and let live strategies during the warfare in WO 1. The live and let live strategy is consistent with his theory of the evolution of cooperation. Together with William D. Hamilton, Axelrod discusses several biological systems. Biological systems seem to be consistent with the theory of cooperation as well. Biological evolution is determined by natural selection, which is marked by cooperation rather than competition. Cooperation is thus the outcome of a slow process, which according to Axelrod needs to speed up.
In short this book is accessible for people who are not familiar with game theory due to the simplicity of the game and the clear structure of the book. Through the interesting empirical insights, applications and relevance of the theory of cooperation this book is enjoyable to read.
- Reviewed by customer ID: A2T9G4E5442IA9
• A Groundbreaking Study On Effective Cooperation 05 January, 2009
Every so often a book comes along that is so groundbreaking it changes the popular worldview. This book, written in 1984 by Robert Axelrod, is just such a seminal work, an original analysis that changed the way experts view cooperation. Its ramifications apply to individuals, organizations, countries and even nonthinking - but nevertheless cooperative - biological life forms, such as bacteria. Axelrod based his book on the famous Prisoner's Dilemma, a classic game created in 1950 by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher of the Rand Corporation. Canadian mathematician Albert W. Tucker added the prison sentence payoffs and gave the game its colorful name. Players have two choices: cooperation or betrayal. Axelrod organized two repeating Prisoner's Dilemma tournaments played by computer programs devised by game theorists, scientists and other experts. His analysis of the tournaments' results confirmed that cooperation is always a better long-term strategy than betrayal and, thus, evolution has favored it. This book, based on that analysis, has become a true classic. getAbstract suggests that anyone who wants to understand the dynamics of cooperation should start by reading this pivotal, illuminating study.
- Reviewed by customer ID: A1NATT3PN24QWY
• The Evolution Of Cooperation: A Review 14 September, 2008
In his phenomenal book The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod explains the logic behind game theory's most influential model- the Prisoner's Dilemma- in a way that even the nontechnical reader can understand. Backing up traditional findings with advanced computer tests, Axelrod relates the Prisoner's Dilemma to evolutionary biology, the live-let-live system of trench warfare during World War I, and family relationships.
After laying out the premises behind the Prisoner's Dilemma, explaining how the model works, and taking the reader through numerous easy to understand real life examples, Axelrod offers the reader advice on how to make decisions efficiently and how to promote cooperation. This is a must read for anyone entering the Political Science field, or people who are just interested in how cooperation can exist in situations in which there is no central authority. The Evolution of Cooperation truly, and simply, answers the question, "Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?"
- Reviewed by customer ID: A2M64G02RZLA5T
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