Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies) |
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| Title: | Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies) |
| Author: | Robert M. Citino |
| Publisher: | University Press of Kansas |
| Type: | Book / Hardcover |
| Publication Date: | 07 October, 2007 |
| ISBN / ISBN-13: | 0700615318 / 9780700615315 |
| List Price: | $34.95 |
| You Save: | $13.03 |
| Amazon Price: | $21.92 |
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Editorial Review / Publisher's Information:
Product Description
For Hitler and the German military, 1942 was a key turning point of World War II, as an overstretched but still lethal Wehrmacht replaced brilliant victories and huge territorial gains with stalemates and strategic retreats. In this major reevaluation of that crucial year, Robert Citino shows that the German army's emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the "war of movement"--attempts to smash the enemy in "short and lively" campaigns--as they were in Hitler's deeply flawed management of the war. From the overwhelming operational victories at Kerch and Kharkov in May to the catastrophic defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad, Death of the Wehrmacht offers an eye-opening new view of that decisive year. Building upon his widely respected critique in The German Way of War, Citino shows how the campaigns of 1942 fit within the centuries-old patterns of Prussian/German warmaking and ultimately doomed Hitler's expansionist ambitions. He examines every major campaign and battle in the Russian and North African theaters throughout the year to assess how a military geared to quick and decisive victories coped when the tide turned against it. Citino also reconstructs the German generals' view of the war and illuminates the multiple contingencies that might have produced more favorable results. In addition, he cites the fatal extreme aggressiveness of German commanders like Erwin Rommel and assesses how the German system of command and its commitment to the "independence of subordinate commanders" suffered under the thumb of Hitler and chief of staff General Franz Halder. More than the turning point of a war, 1942 marked the death of a very old and traditional pattern of warmaking, with the classic "German way of war" unable to meet the challenges of the twentieth century. Blending masterly research with a gripping narrative, Citino's remarkable work provides a fresh and revealing look at how one of history's most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
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Customer Reviews:
• An Extraordinary Contribution To The Literature On The Topic
19 February, 2010
In this text Professor Citino, although covering the German campaigns of 1942 in Russia and North Africa, does not make those activities the primary focus, per se, of his book. The books purpose is to provide perspective into historical German military history relative to what it has been from Napoleonic Wars. The book is actually more a part of a series as opposed to a stand-alone text. it is meant more of sequel to his "The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich" and "Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940". His discussion of the 1942 campaigns is in terms of the context of historical German military strategy, especially its weaknesses in the mechanized age when, unless one wins quickly, it cannot really pay off. Atrition and numbers, in the long term, would make it "obsolete". This is not to say that the book is not a good read on the German campaigns on the Eastern Front and North Africa in 1942, per se, but simply that this is not the book's primary goal.
- Amazon Customer Review
• Death Of The Wehrmacht
22 September, 2009
Citino highlights operational manoeuvre as the Wehrmacht's early ace card supplemented by decision making that was devolved to officers in the field. This was a winning formula until the Allies superior materiel capabilities with their effective use of combined forces overwhelmed the German armies in North Africa and the Soviet Union. Ultimately, and most interestingly, Citino underscores the true folly of Hitler's adventures and the absence of any high level reflection by anyone in the Wehrmacht that recognised that there was no sustainable end point to the campaigns. A terrific read. Lucid, well written and plenty of lessons for present day policy makers.
- Amazon Customer Review
• Conciso Repaso A La Wehrmacht En 1942.
28 October, 2008
Death of the Wehrmacht es un libro que da un repaso a los principales escenarios en que la Wehrmacht participó durante todo 1942: La guerra en el Este y la guerra en África. El nombre ya es bastante significativo, el año de la "muerte" del Ejército Alemán, el año del turning-point, donde dos son las batallas que llevan la égida de la hecatombe: Stalingrado y El Alamein.
Comienza dando un repaso a 1941 (Balcanes, Grecia, Barbarroja, Moscú), pasando luego a 1942 por Crimea, la batalla de Kharkov (Saliente de Izyum), Azul, el Cáucaso y Stalingrado. Eso en el Este. Y en África, prácticamente da un repaso desde marzo del 41 ( somero) para luego llegar hasta finales del 42 con la derrota en El Alamein. El libro sigue una estructura muy amena, ya que los capítulos del Este y del desierto van intercalados, y por tanto es siempre imposible llegar a cansarse de algún escenario.
Citino basa sus conclusiones no sólo en fuentes primarias, sino que la mayoría son secundarias, pero no por ello me parece que sean menos buenas. En general sigue bastante la línea de opinión de la Historia Oficial de Alemania en la Segunda Guerra Mundial (GOH). Hay algunos aspectos que me han llamado la atención: Por ejemplo su opinión con respecto a la actuación ( a nivel estratégico) de Rommel crítica, tal y como lo hace la GOH, o también su crítica a Manstein, el cual se defiende en sus memorias tratando de eximirse de culpa sobre la toma de decisiones acerca del ejército cercado de Stalingrado. Creo que un aspecto básico de su libro es el desarrollo de Azul. Citino explica cómo en Azul se trató de hacer el modo de guerra que se hizo en Barbarroja, sitiando, envolviendo y destruyendo ejércitos, creando kessels, pero por el contrario lo que se encontró fue, en principio, un ejército Rojo casi en desbandada; digamos que un ejército que no se dejaba envolver, que cedía más y más terreno, con el consecuente aumento de la longitud de las líneas de suministro alemanas, crecimiento del frente y dispersión de más tropas. Eso, sumado a algunas decisiones bastante desafortunadas desde lo más alto y al suministro sin fin de hombres de la Gran Patria dejaron un ejército en colapso.
Siempre resulta interesante leer acerca de la guerra en el Cáucaso. En mi opinión, las páginas dedicadas aquí a ello sintetizan con maestría lo que fue aquella aventura, que tan infausto recuerdo dejó en más de un alemán.
Es evidente que Citino conoce bastante del acervo castrense de la casta de militares Prusianos, creado durante más de tres siglos, desde Federico el Grande. Un aspecto que defiende es que el modo de hacer la guerra que tantos éxitos había deparado durante 3 siglos a los militares prusianos se topó con una nueva forma de hacerla, fundada básicamente en la producción industrial de las naciones, en carreras por obtención de materias primas, en la Guerra Total (Por cierto, este término no es utilizado en ningún momento por Citino). En este tipo de guerra Alemania lo tenía mucho más difícil.
Sin duda lo que más me gustó del libro es el despliegue bibliográfico que comenta y discute el señor Citino, reflejado en más de 100 páginas de notas y bibliografía. No tienen por qué ser todas las fuentes usadas fuentes primarias. La mayor parte son secundarias, lo que no hace que sus síntesis sean menos concluyentes. ¡ Cuántos libros en alemán usa! ¡¡ Y no traducidos al inglés!! Esta segunda exclamación es aún más sorprendente. Un mercado insaciable como parece que es el de los libros en inglés sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y el trabajo que queda por delante.
La edición es muy buena, el formato con tapa dura típico de University Press of Kansas. Los mapas son muy claros y suficientes, si bien podría haber algunos más.
- Amazon Customer Review
• Really Not The Best
08 February, 2009
An earlier review (Biggest Problem is the Constant Re-Statement of the Same Premise) included much of what I felt about Death of the Wehrmacht, but I felt the problems went even deeper than that review discussed. Citino argues that the strategic practices of the German army became obsolescent by 1942, and weren't able to cope with modern warfare. Honestly, his point doesn't make sense; the German army continued to punch far above its weight class into 1945, and Citino even acknowledges the spectacular performance and ferocious tenacity of the German army in the later sections of his book. What Citino really says is essentially this : The side with the overwhelming advantage in men, weapons, and fuel won. Duh. This is not to say that Death has no value; it was a fascinating account of the year, battle by battle, and does actually shed some light on Rommel's bad decision making skills in his dive for the Nile, but in the end, Citino is trying to write a history of weight overwhelming merit, which I felt was better accomplished in an economic history (The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze is a fantastic book that covers much of this same history in a much more sensible way). Ultimately, I would read this only for its history, not for its interpretation, and read Wages or perhaps Chris Bellamy's Absolute War (if you really want to read about the Soviets).
- Amazon Customer Review
• Truly Insightful
25 April, 2009
Citino has written a penetrating story explaining the failure of the German efforts in the East and in the African desert during 1942. He uses his previous thesis revealing the German way of combat -- an operational culture of movement and maneuver based on the independence and initiative of subordinate commanders, and used by the Germans since the days of Frederick the Great to defeat and annihilate opponents more powerful and numerous than themselves-- to explain the German failure. Far from being innovative practitioners of a new way of war, Citino claims, the Germans were in fact trapped by their traditional desire to attack at all costs, to view maneuver as the sole route to success in battle, and by their consistent inclination to ignore odds. Usually successful in the past, this approach led the Germans to final disaster, even if it gave them initial operational successes. The new laws of war, where material weight and airpower combined to grind the art of maneuver down to dust, led to the defeats of El Alamein and Stalingrad.
A convincing and thought provoking treatment of an oft-discussed subject. Essential reading for anyone interested in this period of history. Highly recommended.
- Amazon Customer Review
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