After Stalingrad: The Red Army's Winter Offensive, 1942-1943 |
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| Title: | After Stalingrad: The Red Army's Winter Offensive, 1942-1943 |
| Author: | David Glantz |
| Publisher: | Helion and Company Ltd |
| Type: | Book / Hardcover |
| Publication Date: | March, 2009 |
| ISBN / ISBN-13: | 1906033269 / 9781906033262 |
| List Price: | $59.95 |
| You Save: | $22.18 |
| Amazon Price: | $37.77 |
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Editorial Review / Publisher's Information:
Product Description
In the wake of the Red Army's signal victory at Stalingrad, which began when its surprise counteroffensive encircled German Sixth Army in Stalingrad region in mid-November 1942 and ended when its forces liquidated beleaguered Sixth Army in early February 1943, the Soviet High Command (Stavka) expanded its counteroffensive into a full-fledged winter offensive which nearly collapsed German defenses in southern Russia. Exploiting newly released Russian archival materials, After Stalingrad reveals the unbounded ambitions that shaped the Stavka's winter offensive and the full scope and scale of the Red Army's many offensive operations. For example, it reflects on recently rediscovered Operation Mars, Marshal Zhukov's companion-piece to the more famous Operation Uranus at Stalingrad. It then reexamines the Red Army's dramatic offensive into the Donbas and Khar'kov region during February, clearly demonstrating that this offensive was indeed conducted by three rather than two Red Army fronts. Likewise, it describes how the Stavka expanded the scale of its offensive in mid-February 1943 by ordering major strategic efforts, hitherto ignored, by multiple Red Army fronts along the Western (Orel-Smolensk) axis and, in Zhukov's forgotten operation Polar Star, along the Northwestern (Demiansk-Leningrad) axis as well. Finally, by restoring the full scope of these failed or partially failed Red Army offensives to history, this volume also reassesses the impact of Manstein's dramatic counterstrokes in the Donbas and Khar'kov regions, concluding that their impact was equivalent to that of a full-fledged strategic counteroffensive. This new study includes over 100 operational maps to highlight key aspects of the offensives.
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Customer Reviews:
• After Stalingrad
26 May, 2009
This is an important, well written, well-documented book that should be on the shelf of every serious student of World War II and more importantly on the desk of anyone interested in the war on the Eastern Front. Glantz is a first-rate historian and one of the true experts on the Russo-German conflict. Highly Recommended.
- Amazon Customer Review
• Excellent Work - The Usual Glantz High Standard
06 June, 2009
This work describes the Soviet offensive plan in the winter of 1942/43. What is "new" about this work is that he shows that the offensive at Stalingrad and afterwards was not the only offensive on the Eastern Front in early 1943 - in fact, the Soviets were attacking along the full length of the front. The other offensives were not mere diversionary operations, but intended to encircle and destroy both Army Group North and Army Group Center. Since these operations did not succeed, they have been de-emphasized in subsequent Soviet history. Furthermore, in the south, the Soviet offensive had far more ambitious objectives than is generally realized, and thus Manstein's defeat of this offensive is more significant than is generally realized.
Much of the book is dry reading - this division went here and did this, this division went here and did that - but Glantz's analysis of Soviet plans and their execution is well worth reading.
I agree with the other reviewers that the maps are the major weakness of this book. Many of them are so hard to read they're basically worthless. A dark photocopy of a blurry original doesn't help the reader very much at all. Too bad Glantz couldn't get better graphics support!
At the end he refers to this book as being in a "series", and I'm not clear what he means by that. He is also doing a Stalingrad series with a different publisher, and I'm not sure if this book is part of that series or a different series.
On the whole, an excellent work, and if you are a Glantz fan you will want to own this one.
- Amazon Customer Review
• A Very Good Read
07 August, 2009
This book presents a very detailed look at the campaign which has been lacking in other texts.
- Amazon Customer Review
• When Scholarly Work Becomes Too Tedious And Tries Patience
10 February, 2010
David Glanz has written a series of books dealing with various Soviet offensives/campaigns during WWII, all exhaustively researched and largely well written. It's too bad that he wrote one book too many on the general subject, borrowed heavily from his previous works, and crossed the line from entertaining to boring, even to causing me to lose patience reading the work.
As said, I purchased and read Glanz's previous books on assorted Soviet offensives aginst the Nazi German invaders in the period 1941-1944. Several of these other offensives were totally unknown to me, and quite informative. I expected this book's title to delve deeply into the known Stalingrad counteroffensive of November 1942 - February 1943, adding new insights and facts about what transpired. Instead, the reader was taken literally from the peaks of the Caucases Mountain range to the swamps outside Leningrad, for Glanz wanted to show that the whole Russian front was involved with pushing - hopefully crushing - the Nazi foe back to the border. The reader was then treated to minute description of army, corp, even division level units, the number of which began to quickly boggle the mind, making it most difficult to follow. Compound that level of recitation by six or seven times (one for each offensive along the front), and I challenge anyone to come away from this book refreshed and enlightened. Quite the contrary: I almost felt like the poor German Landser in Russia at the time, being attacked by faceless Red hordes differentiated only by their parent unit, with no respite in sight. At some point I wondered why I continued reading the book.
A former positive for Glanz had been the quality of maps provided in his books: they reflected the major terrain features and bodies of soldiers, with arrows to show movement. Alas, in this book Glanz's maps were anything but uniformly well presented. In fact, about a third were so full of information (these based on marked maps used by the combatants at the time), that it became a blob of black symbols and lines across a white background. Totally uninformative, even distracting to the narrative.
If one wants an almost sterile compendium of units available for the Soviet and German sides for a given region at a certain time on the Eastern Front during WWII, this would be the only book one would have to buy. To get the full flavor of battle and how it affected the various units during a given offensive in WWII on the Eastern Front, then get the previous books. They're chock full of facts, but they're easier to read.
- Amazon Customer Review
• Bit Of A Struggle
22 December, 2009
The way that this book is written is that it combines text written by Glantz with that of original documents. Whilst no doubt a good way of conveying the Soviet response to specific events the way the book is written means that it is not a page turner.
It covers the Soviet offensives in late 1942 early 1943. Generally most histories concentrate on the successful Soviet offensive which surrounded the German Sixth Army and then destroyed it. However this was only one of three offensives launched by the Soviets at this time. The operation against Army Group Centre used more tanks than that against Stalingrad but failed. As did the offensive around Lenningrad.
Glantz deals with all three offensives. Whilst only the offensive against Stalingrad was effective it tore a gapping hole in the German line and forced the retreat of the forces which had been operating in the Caucuses. The Soviets then launched further offensives against Army Group South trying to expel them from the Ukraine and Southern Russia. The Germans transferred forces from the West and under Manstien they launched a series of attacks which crippled the Soviets and forced them out of the Ukraine.
Glantz sees the offensive of Manstien as of critical importance in prolonging the war for another couple of years. The Soviets in early 1943 clearly thought that they were in the position to collapse the whole German line.
Previous histories have tended to leave out the Soviet failures and concentrate exclusively on the Stalingrad theatre. Glantz is famous for brining to public attention the Soviet defeat of Operation Mars the attack against Army Group Centre which is discussed again in this volume. His book again illustrates how much of an effort it was for the Soviets to defeat the Germans and the enormous cost.
- Amazon Customer Review
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